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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
17341 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from appellant's conviction of 
forgery in the District Court, Third Judicial District, 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant Michael Jones, was convicted by a jury 
of forgery, a second degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 76-2-202 and Section 76-6-501 (1953 
as amended). The appellant was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for a term of from one to fifteen years. (R. 89). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction and 
denial of the request for a new trial. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 4, 1980, Helen Stokes, the appel-
lant's girlfriend, tried to cash a check for $2,250 at 
Walker Bank (T. 9-11). Appellant waited outside while 
was in the bank ( T. 12, 13) . When the check was present: 
to the bank manager for approval, he recognized that the 
check was forged and immediately called the owner of the 
check, Mr. Fuoco (T. 10, 11). 
Mr. Fuoco indicated that the check had ~ens~ 
from his car on February 1, 1980 (T. 37-40). His car wa:I 
' parked at a garage where appellant worked (T. 44), and i 
appellant had serviced Mr. Fuoco's car that day (T. 45), 
He had not signed the check and had not authorized anyor.: 
else to sign it (T. 37). When he was called by thebanK, 
he verified that the check was stolen and he called the 
police (T. 40). 
The pol ice arrived and arrested Helen Stokes ar.: 
appellant (T. 66, 67). Appellant had fled when the poli: 
I 
I 
arrived but was apprehended soon thereafter (T. 19). !I' 
Appellant was searched and police found money and anotre:I 
· · 11 ( 71) He gave conflictina forged check in his wa et T. . , 
answers to the police at that time (T. 74). As appeJlan: i 
k he saic i and his girlfriend Helen Stokes were ta en away, 1 
her, "I love you anyway, even if you screwed it up."('.· 
59). 
-2-
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Helen Stokes was a minor at the time and was 
referred to Juvenile court (T. 102). As a minor she knew 
she could not be prosecuted for forgery with the appellant 
(T. 108). Appellant was charged as an accomplice to 
forgery (R. 12). At trial, Helen Stokes claimed that she 
had stolen the checks, forged them, put one in appellant's 
wallet and attempted to cash one forged check at the bank 
(while appellant waited outside) all without appellant's 
knowledge (T. 91, 93, 94). The State produced evidence 
showing that appellant was the one most likely to have 
stolen the checks (T. 46, 48). He had over a thousand 
dollars in cash which had come from other checks forged 
earlier (T. 102), as well as an additional forged check (T. 
71). At the bank, he had denied knowing Helen Stokes (T. 
74), but they had gone to the bank together (T. 12, 13, 
94). 
While she claimed responsibility for all aspects 
of the crime, Helen Stokes did not know the color of the 
car the checks were taken from or the location of the 
checks inside the car (T. 100, 101), and she admitted to 
lying to the bank official and the police (T. 103, 104). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty (R. 85). 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison (R. 89, 
90). 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF FORGERY 
Appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the verdict. Respondent disagr<: 
asserting that the evidence produced by the State in thi: 
case was legally sufficient to support the verdict of th: 
jury. 
It is well established in Utah that in order::· 
a convicted defendant to succeed on appeal in challeng:i: 
the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must 
establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertaineGi 
I 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. 
State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880 (1978); State v. 
Wilson, Utah, 565 
P.2d 1321 (1976); 
( 1976). 
P.2d 66 (1977); State v. Jones, Utah,_') 
State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216, .. , 
i 
I 
'·' In State v. Larrun, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980), t:·-1 
Court said: 
It is the exclusive function of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and to 
-4-
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determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, and it is not within the 
prerogative of this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the fact-finder. 
This Court should only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that reasonable men could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
606 P.2d at 231. That case cited numerous other cases as 
standing for the same proposition. 606 P.2d at 231, N. 2. 
State v. Reddish, Utah, 550 P.2d 778 (1976) held that 
where the defendant's version of the story differs from the 
State's, the court must assume that the jury believed that 
version which supports their verdict. 
In reviewing this case, this Court must survey and 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, State v. Helm, Utah, 563 P.2d 794, 796 
(1977); State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 
(1964), and disregard any errors which do not substantially 
preJudice the rights of the appellant, State v. Sinclair, 
supra; Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953 as amended). Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1, a presumption exists to the 
effect that any error found is presumed not to have 
resulted in prejudice. 
Appellant asserts that there was no substantial 
evidence that defendant participated in or had any 
knowledge of the forgery (Appellant's Brief at 5). 
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Appellant was charged with and convicted of forgery in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-2-202 and 
Section 76-6-501 (1953 as amended). They read as follo•:' 
76-2-202. Every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
76-6-501. (1) A person is guilty of 
forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another 
without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that 
the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or uterance 
purports to be the act of another, 
whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been 
executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a copy of an original 
when no such original existed. 
( 2) As used in this section "writing" 
includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols 
of value, right, privilege, or 
identification. 
( 3) Forgery is a felony of the second 
degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
-6-
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(a) A security, revenue stamp, or 
any other instrument or writing issued by 
a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of 
$100 or more, an issue of stocks, bonds, 
or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third 
degree if the writing is or purports to 
be a check with a face amount of less 
than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
The State's burden consisted of introducing evi-
dence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the check had 
been forged, there was an intent to defraud, the check was 
in an amount over $100.00, and the appellant solicited, 
requested, co!lllnanded, encouraged or aided Helen Stokes in 
forging the check and presenting it for cash at the bank. 
As an accomplice, he was then also criminally liable for 
the forgery which was committed by Helen Stokes (R. 39). 
There was sufficient evidence to satisfy such a 
burden. The State did prove that the check in question had 
been forged. The check was not signed by its owner Mr. 
Fuoco, nor did he authorize anyone else to sign it (T. 37). 
Helen Stokes admitted to the making and presentment of the 
forged check with an intent to defraud Walker Bank (T. 95, 
103), The check was made out for over $100.00 (T. 9). 
-7-
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r 
The only issue then is whether Helen Stokes act, 
alone as alleged by the defense or was aided by 1 ' appe k,:I 
as the jury found. Appellant had access to the car tha: 
the checks were stolen from (T. 45, 47). He serviced tt,;' 
car in the morning then took it to a seventh floor park 
area ( T. 46). Later in the day Helen Stokes visited hi: 
at work (T. 48). She testified that she took the checks 
i 
from the car (T. 92), but another witness testified that' 
the car would already have been taken to an upper floor: 
46). Helen Stokes testified that she did not know what 
color the car was, did not recall the color of the inter: 
and took the checks out of a pouch in the car door (T. ii 
101). The car was brown, not green or blue as guessed bi 
Helen Stokes (T. 100, 109, 110). The checks were int:: 
glove compartment of the car as the car does not han~ 
side pouch ( T. 11 O) • Th is is certainly not so "lacking' 
i 
insubstantial" as to preclude the jury from finding tha: j 
the appellant, rather than Helen Stokes, took the checks I 
I 
from the car. 
Evidence as to what took place at the bank is a:: 
in dispute, but there is sufficient basis to find appeL: 
guilty of encouraging Helen Stokes to forge the check. ''. 
testified that appellant waited while she went into the 
1 
-8-
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bank (T. 94). Appellant told the police that he had not 
gone to the bank with her and did not know what she was 
doing (T. 74, 75). He was, however, waiting outside at the 
time. Other discrepancies also appeared in the testimony. 
Helen Stokes said that she put a check in his wallet but 
did not tell the defendant about the check (T. 99). When 
he was arrested, the defendant first denied any knowledge 
of the check, then indicated that Helen Stokes had given it 
to him (T. 74). When questioned about the cash he had, the 
defendant first responded that his mother had given it to 
him (T. 74). Helen Stokes also admitted that she lied to 
the bank manager (T. 103) and lied to the police on several 
occasions (T. 104, 105). 
The defendant also acted very suspiciously. He 
left the bank as soon as he saw the police (T. 19), gave 
varying stories to the police and denied any knowledge of 
Helen Stokes. As they were led away into custody, the 
appellant said to Helen Stokes, "I love you anyway even if 
you screwed it up." (T. 59). 
The defense consisted of the testimony of Helen 
Stokes, who had a motive for taking the blame. She was a 
minor and had already been dealt with by Juvenile Court. 
She could not be prosecuted for the forgery (T. 108). By 
testifying that she was to blame, the defendant would be 
absolved from any liability and they would both go free. 
-9-
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Considering the evidence, respondent submits 
that the jury had sufficient evidence on which to base a 
verdict of guilt. The jury could reasonably have found 
that appellant did take the checks, that he knew they wer: 
forged and that he encouraged Helen Stokes to forge and 
present the checks. He fled when the police arrived and 
gave conflicting responses to their questions. 
Since the credibility of the witnesses became 
crucial and the testimony was conflicting, it was left tc 
the jury to determine which of the conflicting testirnonie: 
it would believe. State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 m: 
State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976). 
The evidence was not so inconclusive and 
insubstantial that there must have been reasonable doo~ 
as to whether the defendant committed the crime. ~, 
Daniels, supra; State v. Wilson, supra; State v. Jones,~ 
State v. Lamm, supra; State v. Menzies, Utah, 601 P.2d~i 
(1979); and State v. Logan, Utah 563 P. 2d 811 (1977). 'i: 
the evidence presented, in the light most favorable tot: 
state, the record clearly contains substantial evidence; 
which the jury could reasonably determine beyond a reaso: 
doubt that appellant did solicit, encourage and aid Hele: 
Stokes in the commission of a forgery. 
In addition, this issue was not properly raise: 
before the trial court in a motion for a new trial. ~· 
t · before thi' s Court on appeaJ, it is not a proper ques ion 
-10-
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J 
trial court should have been given a chance to rule on this 
issue. See State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977); 
Johnson v. Simons, Utah, 551 P.2d 515 (1976). 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS WERE NOT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR INASMUCH AS THE STATEMENTS 
WERE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER TRIAL TACTICS. 
Appellant alleges that statements by Ms. 
Strachan, prosecutor, establishing the credibility of 
Officer Yontz, were prejudicial because they amounted to an 
improper bolstering of that witness' testimony. Respondent 
submits that the comments made by the prosecutor 
constituted a proper exercise of counsel's right to sum up 
her case. 
The prosecutor has the right and the duty to 
analyze the evidence as a whole and to include any 
statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn from such 
evidence. State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949, 951 (1975); 
State v. Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1977). 
Furthermore, the trial court judge is allowed considerable 
latitude of judgment as to what is permissible for counsel 
to argue. Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 412 
( 1961). 
In State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 
530 ( 197 3), the defendant in a rape case claimed that the 
Prose cu tor, in closing argument, was guilty of misconduct. 
This Court, however, held that there was no misconduct 
since the prosecutor, in summing up his case, has "wide 
discretion and is entitled to exercise considerable freedom 
in expressing to the jury his view of the evidence." Id. at 533. 
-11-
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.., 
Counsel's reference to the credibility of Offii 
Yontz was not improper. Defense testimony was conflict:· 
and resolution of the trial required a determination oi 
which version to believe. Helen Stokes, the proponent 
the other version, admitted to lying to bank officers at 
police officers as well as having difficulty recalling 
certain aspects of the case. Thus, it was not improper: 
the prosecutor to explain why the police officer's vers::! 
was credible. The record fails to show that the jury kr.'' 
of the prosecutor's law school connection that is 
complained of. Consequently, the jury could not have dr;, 
the inferences suggested by the appellant. 
Appellant has not shown why it was improper to; 
argue the credibility of Officer Yontz. There is M 
indication as to why appellant claims prejudice resultir: 
from the prosecutor's comment itself. If the statement 
that law students are more perceptive and alert was sud:I 
I 
improper suggestion, then the burden is on the defense 
counsel to correct that error on cross examination. 
. t trl' i Defense counsel should have taken the opportunity a ·I 
to attack the credibility that was "improperly bolstere:: 
In her closing arguments, defense counsel did attack the 
credibility of the officer by reminding the jury that "•i 
rely on Yontz' memory, a memory alone." (T. 132). T~ 
-12-
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prosecution then later tried to rehabilitate the 
credibility of the police officer ( T. 141). If the 
statements were improper and appellant failed to correct 
that error on cross examination, then the error is the 
fault of appellant and not the trial court. 
In addition, appellant failed to object at trial 
to the alleged improper statements. It is probable that 
appellant failed to object at trial because she knew the 
statements were part of proper trial tactics. Conse-
quently, appellant may not complain on appeal that state-
ments were improperly made at trial. The failure to object 
to the prosecutor's remarks, which would have allowed the 
trial court to rule on the alleged errors, resulted in a 
waiver of the right to have the issue reviewed on appeal. 
State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398, 1400 
(1971); State v. Dillon, 104 Ariz 33, 448 P.2d 89, 91 
(1968). 
In State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d 532 (1978), 
counsel made objections to some of the remarks made by the 
prosecutor in summation, but failed to object to all 
remarks listed as grounds for mistrial. This Court held: 
If counsel desires to object and 
preserve his record as to such an error 
during argument, he must call it to the 
attention of the trial court so that if 
he thinks that it is necessary and 
appropriate to do so, he will have an 
opportunity to rectify any error or 
impropriety therein and thus ~bviate the 
necessity of an entire new trial. 
Id. at 555. 
-13-
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It is important to note that it is the 
responsibility of the trial court to determine if alle\' 
improper arguments were prejudicial or harmless. This 
Court has reiterated continuously that it will give grE, 
deference to the judgment of the trial court. In~ 
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), the 
prosecutor asked a question which was clearly objec-
tionable. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The::. 
court ruled that the prosecutor's conduct was not~ 
prejudicial as to violate the defendant's right to a fa;: 
trial, and denied the motion. The defendant appealed. 
After noting that the action of the prosecutor was cer· 
ta inly not to be commended, the Utah Supreme Court foun: 
that the real issue on appeal was whether to sustain th: 
judgment of the trial court. Before affirming the 
conviction the Court said: 
Due to his advantaged position and 
consistent with his responsibilities as 
the authority in charge of the trial, the 
inquiry is necessarily addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. · • 
Inasmuch as this is his primary respon-
sibility, when he has given due 
consideration and ruled upon the matter, 
this court on review should not upset his 
ruling unless it clearly appears that he 
has abused his discretion. 
30 Utah 2d at 369-70. 
Further, appellant has pointed to no harm that 
resulted from this allegedly improper statement. 
-14-
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such a showing, appellant has failed to suffer harm and the 
statement, if it was error at all, was harmless. See Rule 
4 1 Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Finally, the test found in State v. Valdez, 30 
Utah 2d 54, 60 513 P.2d 422 (1973), cited by appellant, is 
not met in this case. First, the statement did not "call 
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not 
be justified in considering." The statement was made to 
emphasize the credibility of the officer. Certainly the 
jury is entitled to hear information concerning the 
credibility of the witnesses. In fact, the jury members 
were told that they were "the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence." (R. 46). Thus, the jury was justified in 
considering the remark. 
Second, there is no showing that if the statement 
had been improper, the jury was influenced by the remark. 
While the jury may have been influenced by the officer's 
testimony, Valdez requires that the jury be influenced by 
the prosecutor's statement, not that of the witness. 
Appellant has not alleged that the jury was influenced by 
the prosecutor's remarks. (See Appellant's Brief at P· 8). 
Respondent submits that the statements complained 
of were within the realm of proper trial tactics. 
~ppellant failed, at trial, to object to the statements, to 
-15-
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attack the witness' credibility, or to request a new tr: 
Thus, appellant may not complain on appeal. The trial 
court properly exercised its discretion and did not rul; 
that there was any prejudice. Appellant has not shown, 
prejudice and therefore this court should find that the 
statements were not error or that if they were, they wer: 
harmless. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE A REQUESTED ALTERNATIVE 
HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred ir 
giving a jury instruction that did not include an 
alternative hypo th es is. Respondent answers that such ar. 
alternative hypothesis instruction was not required int:. 
case. 
Appellant has not shown why this instruction Wi'i 
I 
required. There has been no authority cited which suppc:1 
the contention that the ommission of the alternative ! 
hypothesis was improper. 
The standard in Utah as to the giving of such:: 
instruction was stated in State v. Fort, Utah, 572 p,ld 
1387 (1977); and State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 p,:: 
57 (1960): 
-16-
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[W]here the only proof of material fact 
or one which is a necessary element of 
defendant's guilt consists of 
circumstantial evidence, such circum-
stances must reasonably preclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's 
innocence ... 
[T]his rule is applicable only where the 
proof of a material issue is based solely 
on circumstantial evidence . • • 
355 P.2d at 59, 60 (emphasis added). The principle was 
cited and reaffirmed in State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 
470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 
216 (1976); State v. Dumas, Utah, 554 P. 2d 1313 (1976); 
and State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019 (1978). 
In the present case, that standard was met by the 
trial court. The evidence was not solely circumstantial 
and thus did not require giving such an instruction to the 
jury. Evidence consisted of direct as well as circum-
stantial evidence. The physical evidence introduced at 
trial, the testimony of witnesses as to the appellant's 
actions, and the lack of credibility of the alternative 
hypothesis propounded by Helen Stokes all constituted 
direct evidence and precluded requiring an alternative 
hypothesis instruction to the jury. Where the evidence is 
both direct and circumstantial, the trial judge may 
properly leave the determination to the jury on the basis 
of reasonable doubt. State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 
(1976); State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 
(1970); State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 
( 1961). 
An instruction on reasonable doubt provides an 
understandable criterion for decision making; an 
_,7_ 
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instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis ~ 
unnecessary and may confuse the jury. In the instant c:i 
the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt. ,,: 
Instruction No. 20 (R. 54). The trial judge determine~ 
i 
that the presence of direct evidence was sufficient ca~:1 
to exclude a reasonable alternative hypothesis instructi:i 
Such a determination was within his discretion and was 
properly exercised. 
The trial judge, exercising his discretioo, 
refused to give the alternative hypothesis instruction 
i 
explaining that it was "given in substance." (R. 65) s:·] 
this is an area for the exercise of judicial discretion,] 
i 
appellant must show an abuse of discretion, i.e., that t:I 
' judge was required to give such an instruction. Appell'' I 
has not alleged, nor shown, an abuse of discretion. ! 
Appellant has not only failed to show that his! 
requested instruction is required, but has also failed ::I 
show that if it were to be required in this case, it wocl 
have made some difference in the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
,.1 
The evidence was not inconclusive or improba.-'I 
but was sufficient to support the verdict. The prose· I 
cu tor's closing arguments were not prejudicial error as I 
they were part of proper trial tactics designed to 
establish the credibility of witnesses. 
-18-
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hypothesis instruction was properly denied by the trial 
judge as it was not required in this case. For these 
reasons, the request for a new trial should be denied and 
appellant's conviction affirmed. 
DATED this JB~day of August, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of thEe foregoing to G. L. Fletcher, Attorney for 
Appellant,~ South Second East, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
this /<f day of August, 1981. 
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